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sembly of Upper Canada to the inhabitants of that province. If any three chapters rise above the rest in merit, they are those on "Surrender of Hull's Army", "Operations on the Detroit Frontier", and "Plattsburg". Three others, if a phrase of Dr. Hannay may be borrowed, "can well be left to the reader's contempt" (p. 110): "Causes which led to the War", "War declared by President Madison", and "The Capture of Washington".

KENDRIC CHARLES BABCOCK.

Sea Power in its Relations to the War of 1812. By Captain A. T. MAHAN, D.C.L., LL.D., United States Navy. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company. 1905. Two vols., pp. xxii, 423; xix, 456.)

THESE volumes, which conclude Captain Mahan's series of works on "The Influence of Sea Power upon History", are intended for the general reader, as well as the specialist, being written in a popular style with the use of no technical nautical terms which are not explained. The author stands in a class by himself, having created his own model. A skilled historical investigator and a skilled seaman, he has brought the two qualifications together with remarkable results; nor can it be properly said that he has exaggerated the influence of sea power upon history, although he has given it such surprising predominance. Certainly he has not exaggerated it in its relations to the War of 1812, for that war was caused by regulations affecting the navigation of the sea and there the principal fighting occurred.

The work opens with an account of the remote causes of the war, dating from a hundred years before the Revolution, and of the immediate causes, which were two: the impressment of American seamen and the restriction of the carrying-trade. All other grievances were subordinate to these and could have been adjusted; but these were fundamental. The British position was defensible only on the ground of necessity brought about by the struggle with France. The American position, on the other hand, was correct, Jefferson and Madison having put the case on sound principles. The country was, unfortunately, divided, and a strong faction deprecated resistance to Great Britain. Captain Mahan quotes Gouverneur Morris (I. 71) as saying in 1794 that the United States ought to have at least twelve ships of the line, and thinks if even this moderate navy had been in existence there might have been no war; but Jefferson's policy of neglect of the navy made his attitude on paper toward Great Britain ludicrous in her eyes. Captain Mahan does justice to Madison's great ability, but insists that he was a "deskman" (p. 106) who seemed never to understand that deeds must lie back of words. He quotes (*ibid.*) a remark of Pompey: "Will you never have done with citing laws and privileges to men who wear swords?" Great Britain came to believe that the United States would argue and threaten but never fight. She fought too late and was unprepared.

As the reviewer thinks, Captain Mahan underestimates the difficulties confronting the administration. It was blameworthy for not having brought the country into a better state of preparedness for the war; but to fight the war efficiently it must have had a united country back of it, and that it did not have. Not only, as Captain Mahan truly says, was the country deficient in national spirit; but he might have added that many of the Federalists were mere colonial Englishmen, who were determined not to fight the mother-country, who obstructed every move the administration made, and who openly exulted in American disasters during the war. To weld the country into a homogeneous people efficiently supporting their government was a task beyond the power of man. Nor is Captain Mahan without injustice in his treatment of the controversy which terminated in the dismissal of Jackson, the British minister. No minister had ever gone so far in insolence, and no self-respecting government could have done other than dismiss him.

Coming to the war itself, Captain Mahan declares that the plan of invading Canada was correct. He defines the true purposes of war very happily (p. 294): "An attachment is issued, so to say, or an injunction laid, according to circumstances; as men in law do to enforce payment of a debt, or abatement of an injury. If, in the attempt to do this, the other nation resists, as it probably will, then fighting ensues; but that fighting is only an incident of war." That Canada did not fall into American hands early in the war was due to the inefficient condition of the American army. Its record was an almost unbroken record of shame, redeemed by the Niagara campaign of 1814 alone, and culminating in the everlasting disgrace of the rout at Bladensburg, which was the natural result of Jefferson's policy of reliance upon citizen soldiery.

From the start the successes of the war were with the navy, and the *Constitution's* victory over the *Guerrière* roused pride in the navy for the first time. Yet all the naval victories showed the inestimable value of preparedness. The *Constitution* was a stronger ship than the *Guerrière* and had a better battery than the *Java* which she beat afterward. The *Hornet* under Lawrence had two-thirds more battery power than the *Peacock* which she destroyed, and Perry won the battle of Lake Erie with a fleet generally superior to the enemy's. Perry's tactics were those which Captain Mahan urges: "L'audace, et encore de l'audace, et toujours de l'audace!" (pp. 65-66). He contrasts the brilliant results of Perry's audacity with the negative results of Chauncey's caution. Nevertheless, Lawrence should not, he thinks, have taken the *Chesapeake* into the action with the *Shannon* which terminated so disastrously to the American ship, because she was clearly overmatched. The naval victories on Lake Champlain and the military victories at New Orleans are treated as events irrelevant to the objects and outcome of the war.

Captain Mahan's treatment of the war is at once impartial and instructive, and it teaches a lesson which the country ought never to forget. The volumes close with the best account of the negotiations which terminated in the treaty of Ghent which has thus far been published.

Besides the ordinary and accessible printed sources of material Captain Mahan has used in the preparation of his book the Navy Department manuscripts, the Canadian archives, British Record Office manuscripts and Admiralty Letters, and the Castlereagh manuscripts, the last-named being especially rich in diplomatic history of the last stages of the war. The volumes are well printed, with few errors, and are illustrated with maps for the student to use and with pictures of officers, ships, and battles for ornamentation. The index is carefully made.

GAILLARD HUNT.

Lopez's Expeditions to Cuba, 1850 and 1851. By ANDERSON C. QUISENBERY. [Filson Club Publications, Number 21.] (Louisville, Kentucky: John P. Morton and Company. 1906. Pp. 172.)

THIS interesting and vivid narrative was originally prepared as the basis of a historical novel, and it would be manifestly unfair to judge it as a piece of critical historical writing, which it does not pretend to be. The most critical comparison and sifting of the sources (widely scattered in pamphlets, newspapers, magazines, and official reports in two languages) are necessary before anything approaching an accurate and impartial history of the events can be written. Vidal Morales, in his excellent work, *Iniciadores y Primeros Martires de la Revolución Cubana* (Havana, 1901), gave the fullest and most accurate account of Lopez's ventures, but he wrote almost entirely from the sources in the Spanish language and from a sympathetic Cuban viewpoint. Some important original documents have since appeared in the *Boletin del Archivo Nacional*, Havana, and there are in the same depository several still unpublished.

Lopez occupies really a secondary place in Mr. Quisenberry's narrative. His heroes are Crittenden, O'Hara, and the other Americans, generally, but the Kentuckians in particular. The real character and aims of the expeditions are either assumed or not discussed. The evidence seems conclusive against the view that Lopez aimed to bring about the annexation of the island. On the other hand, this purpose must be distinctly attributed to all the Americans who either sympathized, aided, or followed the expeditions. Mr. Quisenberry takes the usual view that the natives were as a whole friendly to the Spanish government or too weak and long-suffering to raise the standard of rebellion. But the captain-general's despatches and a good deal of other evidence tend to establish the opposite view regarding the temper of the Cubans. The failure of the expeditions to obtain the co-operation of the native population must be set down rather to their annexationist design, to their large foreign composition, to the fact that they were conducted by an ex-officer of the Spanish army who had never won the confidence of the Cubans, and, not least, to the rash and impracticable manner in which the expeditions were conducted. To say (p. 57) that "there